BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the desert region near Tindouf (Algeria), about 160.000 relatively unknown refugees from the Western Sahara are grouped in camps, preparing for eventual return to their homeland. Their original country, Western Sahara, is the last colonial state still to declare its independence. After several years of war and sand, after 13 years of United Nation Mission, the conflict, which opposes Morocco and Polisario Front, seems still now far from a clear and stable solution. It is called the 'forgotten conflict', because of the long no solution term, and the appearance lack of interest of the main international powers. In reality this assertion is not completely true. This sand-made territory hides great economic resources, such as phosphates, petrol, manganese, uranium, and the fishing coasts. Moreover is a key area in the Maghreb region, without which any serious trial of regional union will be impossible. In this essay I will briefly introduce the roots of the struggle, then I will discuss the political strategies towards the referendum issue, with regard to the refugees problem, finally I will illustrate the social, political and economical challenges in the occupied territories.

Western Sahara is located in the North Africa on the Atlantic Ocean between Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. Former Spanish colony, in 1975 was invaded by Morocco and Mauritania who claimed the sovereignty over this territory. Saharawi people who were yet fighting against Spanish colonialism, had to face the new opponents. The war forced many Saharawi to escape and the Polisario Front- the political organization of Saharawi people- founded the Western Saharan Arab Republic (1976), which is placed in the refugees' camps of Algeria. As a consequence, the conflict assumed two different aspects: from classical decolonisation, as liberation from the Spanish power, to war between African states. For this reason, in a first time, the UN were the principal organisation concerned and in a second period, the OUA (Organisation of the African Unite) was the major regional organisation implicated to solve the conflict. Since 1963 the UN considered the issue of Western Sahara. In particular, the resolution N. 2229 (XXI), 1966 stated the rights for Saharawi people to rich their own independence from the Spanish colony through a free and fair referendum. Every follow resolutions restated this point. In 1975, after the withdrawal of Spain, the International Court of Justice affirmed that, even though political ties of allegiance between the Kingdom of Morocco and Western Saharan tribes existed, neither Morocco nor Mauritania should have sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Nevertheless, few days later Morocco started the 'Green March', when about 350.000 people advanced toward Western Sahara, the March hid the military operation. On the 14 November Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accords, which divided the territory into two: the northern to Morocco and the southern to Mauritania. Spain and Morocco agreed on exclusive rights to exploit the phosphate deposits.

According to the Moroccan point of view, Morocco independence, reached in 1956, is still unachieved. This way of thinking belongs to the theory of 'Greater Morocco', initially launched by Allal el Fassi, ancient leader of the Istiqlal (independence) Party. Greater Morocco was seen to include part of Mali, Mauritania, southwestern Algeria, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, the Tarfaya region, Ifni and Western Sahara. As noted by Thobhani, 'in general, Morocco based its claims on the argument that these territories had belonged to Morocco in the past and that the European powers had detached them from Morocco during colonization in the nineteenth century', (Thobhani, 2002, p.51). In Morocco this idea is still rooted, above all among the most nationalist wings. In spite of the recent changes in the last few years of the Moroccan government, such as the death of King Hassan II and the destitution of Driss Basri (former Prime Minister), the policy towards Western Sahara territories has never changed. For instance, this attitude is clearly shown through the development policy of the Moroccan government towards 'his South Provinces'. What is more, Morocco interprets the judgment of the International Court of Justice in his favour, highlighting the ancient relationships between the Moroccan affiliated tribes and the saharawi tribes' confederation.

A part from the political reasons, the huge amount of great economic resources is a vital point to better understands the struggle. Western Sahara is reach of oil, relatively recently discovered (1964) by a Spanish trade and of gas, vanadium, iron, uranium, titanium, prized stones. In particular, there is a massive concentration of phosphates in the so-called 'useful triangle' in the Boucraa zone, among the cities of Smara, Laayoune, and Boujdour. As De Saint Maurice points out, Morocco could be the second major exporter of phosphate after the United States with Western Sahara, (De Saint Maurice, 2000). In addition, is well worth considering the importance of the rich fishing coasts of the territory, and the recent debate over the legality of the Moroccan trade with the European Union.

According to the saharawi point of view, the dispute concerns a decolonisation issue, that is to say, Spain unattended the international accords and nowadays saharawi people are facing another colonialism: that of Morocco. During my stay, last year in the refugees' camps, this opinion was strongly tangible. People do not believe anymore in the effectiveness of the United Nations and look at Morocco as a new colonial power. As a consequence they will never accept the recent proposal of autonomy into the Moroccan Kingdom by the UN, (S/2001/613, annexe I), but they believe in the referendum as the best solution to end the conflict. However, also the UN consider the dispute as a decolonisation issue, indeed, they treat the conflict inside the Decolonisation Commission.

In 1990, the United Nations intervened concretely in the region by sending the United Nation Mission for the Referendum (MINURSO). His aim was mainly to implement the peace plan elaborated by the UN together with the OUA. According to the plan, accepted by both Polisario and the government of Morocco, by the referendum of self-determination Saharawi people had to decide whether they want to be independent or to join the Kingdom of Morocco. The referendum, based on Spanish census of 1974, had to take place after a transition period since the 6th September, date of the ceasefire, but the transition period never found an end. Many troubles intervened to slow and then to stop the peace process, such as the military presence of the Moroccan Army (FAR) in the territory, the bombs attacks towards Tifariti even after the ceasefire, the late of the United Nation staff in the region, but above all the identification problem of the electorate. Considering the nomadic feature of Saharawi tribes, it is understood that the Spanish census needed a revision with a demographical actualisation. Indeed, many Saharawi could not to be present at the moment of the referendum, even though they had a bond with the territory. In view of this revision, Morocco decided to send into the region a huge number of settlers to be enrolled as voters. It is well worth remembering that many Saharawi escaped towards Morocco during the Spanish colonisation that is why, Moroccan immigrants could claim to participate to the vote. These influxes, politically driven by Moroccan government, lead to an impasse in the identification process of the United Nations, which were unable to face the massive registration's requests of the electorate. Besides, taking into account the immense difficulties of the identification process, recently the UN decided to abandon the peace plan, proposing a political solution; but nor Polisario, nor Algeria will never accept the 'autonomy plan', which suggests that Western Sahara should be a province of the United Kingdom of Morocco.

Since the start of the war, every effort of Morocco goes in the same direction. His patent policy is that of the 'retaken of the south provinces', as it is unambiguously shown, for example, toward the Moroccan government web site, where there is a special page consecrated to this topic. Indeed, the political strategy of Morocco has been that of modifying the demographical composition of the territory, leading a 'moroccanization' of the area. As Thobhani points out, 'demographically, the transformation in Western Sahara has occurred in the following three important ways: the population size, the composition of the population, and cultural changes', (Thobhani, 2000). For instance, according to the 1974 census taken by Spain, the population of Western Sahara was counted at about 74,000 inhabitants; after the Moroccan influx the requests to vote have risen at 330.000 in 1994, (De Froberville, 1996). In addition, Morocco gave incentives to the immigrants to settle in Western Sahara, such as subsidies on some basic commodities, like fuel and food; tax breaks, higher salaries, free or low-coast housing. Monetarily considering, King Hassan invested million of dollars to integrate the territory into the rest of the Kingdom. Consequently, nowadays the principal cities of Western Sahara are modern cities served by modern transport and communications networks. In spite of being almost a desert region, cities are provided of all commodities and with every sort of shops. What is more, the massive development and modernisation during the past 25 years, has led to an inevitable Moroccanization under every aspects, such as urbanisation, education, diet, media, housing, living style, architecture, business, commerce, health care, entertainment, sports, and politics. Besides, as Thobhani states, 'since the takeover of the territory by Morocco, important holidays associated with Moroccan history are now celebrated in the territory. These include the Throne Day commemorating the day of succession of the King, the anniversary of the Green March, and specific days when the various regions of the territory were integrated into Morocco', (Thobhani, 2000). Moreover, people in Western Sahara now do not speak Spanish anymore, but they adopted French as in Morocco.

To sum up, there are two different positions about this issue: Morocco considers Western Sahara as his own south provinces and bases his sovereignty on historical ties of allegiance among Moroccan and Saharawi tribes. In addition, Morocco claims that many Moroccans have being ignored in the Spanish census, that is why it considers that many others Moroccans have the right to vote in the referendum of self-determination. On the other hand, Polisario Front considers that the conflict is a problem of decolonisation, and that only the people in the census made by Spain constitute the electorate. Besides, enormous changes have happened in the region since the takeover of Morocco. Despite some transformations could be judge positively, as the modernisation, the new infrastructures and services, it is well worth considering the lack of freedom and the climax of substantial tension in the territory. The Moroccan military presence in the area is an evident indicator that this driven development cannot last still long time. For the same reason, there is a lack of information about the situation in Western Sahara. For this purpose, it has been fundamental the research of Prof. Thobhani, who wrote about life in Western Sahara, after his stay in the territory. However, it is well worth remembering that his stay was planned with the Moroccan government. Taking into account another cultural aspect, the native people of Western Sahara have been obliged to modify their essential nature, mainly from nomadic to sedentary life. Indeed, according to the logic of the referendum, to provide the citizenship has been the most important feature for both sides, Morocco and Polisario. In addition, one of the main aspects of debate is the impartiality of the United Nations. For example, the scarcity of forces sent in the area since 1990 and the delay of the peace plan implementation have being accused by many observers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

De Froberville, M. (1996) Sahara Occidental, la confiance perdue. L'impartialite' de l'ONU a l'epreuve. Paris, L'Harmattan.

De Saint Maurice, T. (2000) L'enjeu du referendum d'autodetermination, Paris, L'Harmattan.

ICJ, Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 16 October 1975, Volume IV, p.497.

Lawless, R., Monahan, L. (1987) War and refugees, the Western Sahara conflict, London, Printer Publishers.

Thobhani, A. (2002) Western Sahara since 1975 under Moroccan administration, social, economic, and political transformation, Lewiston, New York, The Edwin Mellen Press.

www.mincom.gov.ma/english/reg_cit/regions/sahara/sahara.html, History of the Reintegration of the Saharan Provinces, date of access: 2-09-03.

http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/reg_cit/regions/sahara/s_hist.htm, Historical Foundations of the Moroccanity of the Sahara, date of access: 10-09-03.

http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/minurso.pdf, map of Western Sahara, Minurso website, updated May 2003, date of access: 28- 08-03.

http://www.un.org/documents/, United Nations documents, date of access: 2-09-03.

http://membres.lycos.fr/tomdsm/res2229.pdf, United Nations and Western Sahara, updated 11-06-2003, date of access: 28-08-03.

www.arso.org, updated 03-09-2003, date of access: 2-09-03.